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1. Introduction
The financial market turmoil that started in August 2007 resulted in a sharp rise
in borrowing costs, leading to a systematic increment in the prices of insurance
against default (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). Under those extreme market con-
ditions, the liquidity of many credit instruments evaporated, and concerns about
the existence of a market-wide liquidity risk factor being priced in credit mar-
kets have made room for related studies in the financial literature. Along these
lines, the empirical evidence about the existence of a liquidity risk factor that
is priced in the corporate bond markets is conclusive. A non-exhaustive review
of this literature comprises the early work of Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005),
who were pioneers in capturing the illiquidity discount in corporate bonds using
default swap spreads as pure measures of default risk. Bao, Pan and Wang (2011)
also find that bond illiquidity changes over time, exhibiting an important com-
monality in a cross-section of US corporate bonds, and Lin, Wang and Wu (2011)
provide evidence that market-wide liquidity is priced in bond returns. In addition,
De Jong and Driessen (2012) show a significant liquidity premium in a sample
of corporate bond indexes of US bonds, being larger for lower-rated firms. More
recently, Acharya, Amihud and Bharath (2013) show that liquidity risk becomes
a significant determinant of US corporate bond returns, especially during finan-
cially stressed time periods, finding that the market price of liquidity is higher for
non-investment grade bonds.
Although there is consensus on the importance of illiquidity shocks in corpo-
rate credit markets, fewer papers have examined the role of liquidity in sovereign
credit markets under stressed circumstances. For instance, Beber, Brandt and
Kavajecz (2009) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) find that during periods
of market stress with large flows in the Euro-area bond market, liquidity explains
a greater proportion of sovereign yield spreads than credit quality. There is also
recent evidence that sovereign liquidity matters to institutions and institutional in-
vestors. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) document that decreases
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in Treasury supply raise the price of liquidity and drive down the yield on Trea-
suries relative to less liquid assets. Fontaine and Garcia (2012) study the role
of financial intermediaries and find that funding liquidity is an important compo-
nent of outstanding US Treasury bond returns, especially during crises. Hu, Pan
and Wang (2013) argue that abnormal noise in US Treasury prices is a symptom
of shortage in arbitrage capital, and that this abnormal noise can be used as a
proxy of illiquidity conditions of the overall market. A limited number of papers
have suggested different liquidity effects at different maturities. Goyenko, Sub-
rahmanyam and Ukhov (2011) note that during recessions the US Treasury mar-
ket becomes more illiquid, and the increase in illiquidity is more pronounced for
short-term maturities. Pan and Singleton (2008) indicate that illiquidity could be
behind the idiosyncratic behavior of the short-term sovereign default swap matu-
rities. Additionally, Bongaerts, Jong and Driessen (2011) suggest that unwinding
a short-maturity CDS contract may be more costly than for a 5-year CDS. This
preliminary evidence of different liquidity effects at different maturities motivates
us to investigate whether there exists an illiquidity risk premium contained in the
term structure of the CDS market to compensate those investors trading the most
illiquid short-term contracts.
This paper studies the role of sovereign illiquidity risk, focusing on periods of
financial distress. The information about default and liquidity is extracted from
sovereign credit default swap (CDS) contracts, the preferred instrument of in-
vestors for shorting sovereign risk or speculating against the default of a country.
CDSs are suitable tools for capturing the credit risk of the reference, as the infor-
mational content in default swap spreads leads stock and bond markets in terms
of the price discovery process; see Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) or Forte
and Peña (2009). The sample comprises the full term structure of sovereign CDSs
of main developed economies during the period from January 2006 to May 2013,
covering the current financial crisis.
The modeling framework employed here builds on the spirit of Longstaff et al.
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(2005) and Arakelyan, Rubio and Serrano (2013), who identify the illiquidity
discount process as the unexplained component in bonds and CDS prices, respec-
tively.1 In particular, we closely follow Arakelyan et al. (2013) in analyzing the
compensation to investors in corporate CDS portfolios for the risk of unwinding
their positions when trading in the less liquid part of the curve – the maturities
different from the 5-year CDS contract – . The information about the illiquidity
discount is extracted from the short-term sovereign default swap spreads, in accor-
dance with Pan and Singleton (2008), who consider the existence of an idiosyn-
cratic liquidity factor in the CDS behavior at these maturities. We then estimate
the illiquidity risk premium by using a continuous-time specification to model the
dynamics of the risk-neutral illiquidity (γQt ) and the arrival rate of default (λ
Q
t )
discount processes of sovereign CDS contracts.
The main empirical findings in this paper can be summarized as follows. In
addition to the default risk compensation in CDS prices reported by Pan and Sin-
gleton (2008) and Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton (2011), we find a pos-
itive reward for investors trading in the illiquid part of the sovereign CDS curve.
This illiquidity risk clearly affects the price of insurance against sovereign de-
fault, especially at short-term maturities. Moreover, the illiquidity premium is
time-varying, and it dramatically increases during market-wide events such as the
Lehman Brothers collapse or the European sovereign debt crisis. Second, the es-
timated illiquidity processes exhibit a significant comovement across countries,
similarly to the commonality on sovereign default premia previously reported by
Pan and Singleton (2008), Zinna (2013) or Groba, Lafuente and Serrano (2013).
A principal component (PC) analysis on the illiquidity series shows that two com-
ponents account for 56% of the total variance. The projections of these principal
1The literature on modeling the liquidity in credit markets by continuous-time processes was
initiated by Longstaff et al. (2005) and Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2006). This approach has been
continued by, for example, Chen, Cheng and Wu (2013), Chen, Fabozzi and Sverdlove (2010),
Bühler and Trapp (2009) and Lin, Liu and Wu (2009) within the context of CDS markets.
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components onto aggregate measures of market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads,
result in positive and statistically significant beta coefficients. These findings sug-
gest the existence of a systematic illiquidity risk premium that is priced in the
cross-section of sovereign CDS spreads.
Additionally, an inspection of the loadings of the first PC of the illiquidity
premium shows that it is an equally-weighted contribution of individual sovereign
CDS contracts. This first component might be interpreted as a rough estimate
of aggregate illiquidity compensation. An analogous result is observed for the
default risk premium. Then, we estimate a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model
to delve into the dynamic relationship between aggregate illiquidity and default
compensation. The null hypothesis that illiquidity causes (in the sense of Granger)
default is empirically rejected. Notably, causality from default to illiquidity is not
rejected by the Granger tests. These results are robust after controlling for stock
market changes and liquidity proxies such as the bid-ask spreads.
Finally, our approach sheds light on the nature of certain systematic events
during the recent financial crisis. According to our results, the collapse of Lehman
Brothers on September 15th, 2008, resulted in a global systematic shock of illiq-
uidity outside the US. In contrast, the effect detected inside the US was more
important in terms of default compensation. Interestingly, it was the impact of
the Euro crisis that led to a sharp rise in the compensation for liquidity in the US
market.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents the sample and the econometric framework. Sections 4 and
5 analyze the illiquidity process and the illiquidity premia in sovereign CDS
spreads, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2. A two factor model for CDS prices
2.1. Model setup
This paper adopts a continuous-time approach for extracting the illiquidity risk
premium in sovereign CDS spreads. In this setting, default swaps are both pricing
the default and the illiquidity risk of the reference entity. Then, the arrival of a
default event (λQt ) is modeled by a log Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (log-OU) process that,
under the risk-neutral measure Q, is expressed as,
d ln λQt = κ
Q
1
(
θ
Q
1
− ln λQt
)
dt + σ
Q
1
dW
Q
1t
, (1)
with κQ
1
the mean-reversion speed, θQ
1
the long-run mean, and σQ
1
the volatility of
the default. The variable dWQt is a Brownian motion. The process λ
Q
t corresponds
to the intensity of the Poisson process that triggers the credit event; see, among
others, Duffie and Singleton (1997) and Lando (1998). Within the context of in-
tensity models, the log-OU specification ensures the positiveness of the default
process, as in Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson and Schranz (2005), Pan and
Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2011). Other modeling alternatives, such as
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (CIR), have been discarded be-
cause of the extreme movements of default swap spreads during the crisis period.
For example, the Feller condition in CIR processes limits the long-term mean of
the intensity process to the square-root of its long-term variance, a fact that is
frequently violated in credit spreads during the period 2007-2012.
The (risk-neutral) discount illiquidity process γQt is also modeled by a log-OU
process,
dγ
Q
t = κ
Q
2
(
θ
Q
2
− ln γQt
)
dt + σ
Q
2
dW
Q
2t
(2)
where κQ
2
, θQ
2
and σQ
2
are the mean-reversion speed, the long-run mean, and the
volatility of the illiquidity process, respectively. The γQt process reflects the risk-
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neutral illiquidity of CDS spreads, and it is extracted from the term-structure of
CDS spreads using the prices from the most illiquid part of the CDS curve.2
Expressions (1) and (2) also admit a formulation under the historical measure
P as follows,
d ln λQt = κ
P
1
(
θP1 − ln λ
Q
t
)
dt + σ
Q
1
dWP1t , (3)
and,
d ln γQt = κ
P
2
(
θP2 − ln γ
Q
t
)
dt + σ
Q
2
dWP2t , (4)
by applying the change of measure dWQt = Λtdt + dW
P
t . The prices of risk of
the default and illiquidity processes are, respectively, Λ1t = δ01 + δ11 ln λ
Q
t and
Λ2t = δ02 + δ12 ln γ
Q
t . Therefore, the relationship between parameters results in
κPi θ
P
i = κ
Q
i
θ
Q
i
+ δ0iσ
Q
i
and κQ
i
= κPi + δ1iσ
Q
i
, with i = 1, 2.
Our modeling proposal nests the specification of Pan and Singleton (2008) and
Longstaff et al. (2011) by including the illiquidity as an additional factor on pric-
ing the sovereign default swaps. A similar strategy has been previously proposed
by Arakelyan et al. (2013) to capture the influence of illiquidity in credit-quality-
sorted portfolios on corporate CDS spreads.
2.2. The illiquidity risk premia
When liquidity is heterogeneous across maturities, agents who look for arbi-
trage opportunities across the curve are also should require a compensation for
closing their positions when needed (Arakelyan et al., 2013). Within the context
of our model, the illiquidity risk premium accounts for the compensation due to
2Note that the illiquidity process is not modeled as a Poisson arrival. Some papers have mod-
eled illiquidity in the same way as default events, suggesting that only the expected arrival of large
illiquidity events matters in CDS pricing.
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changes in the trading ability of the CDS contract. We quantify the size of this
illiquidity risk premium following the strategy in Pan and Singleton (2008) and
Longstaff et al. (2011), which estimates the compensation of the default risk pre-
mium.3 We next describe how to derive the illiquidity risk premium.
In the absence of compensation for the uncertainty of changes in the default or
liquidity environment, or zero risk-premium, equation (2) collapses to (4). Other-
wise, the existence of a reward for changes in the risk factor conditions results in
divergences between risk-neutral and (pseudo) actual measures. Let us consider
the CDS spread under the risk-neutral measure,
CDS
Q
t (M) =
4
(
1 − RQ
) ∫ t+M
t
D(t, u)EQt
[
λ
Q
u e
−
∫ u
t
(λ
Q
s +γ
Q
s ) ds
]
du
∑4M
i=1 D(t, t + j/4)E
Q
t
[
e−
∫ t+.25i
t
(λ
Q
s +γ
Q
s ) ds
] , (5)
where M is the maturity of the CDS, D(·) is the risk-free discount rate and RQ
is the risk-neutral recovery rate. Then, the illiquidity risk premium is defined as
follows,
RPilliq,t = CDS
Q
t − CDS
P
illiq,t , (6)
where CDS P
illiq,t
are called the pseudo-spreads and are expressed as
CDS Pilliq,t(M) =
4
(
1 − RQ
) ∫ t+M
t
D(t, u)EQt
[
λ
Q
u e
−
∫ u
t
λ
Q
s ds
]
EPt
[
e−
∫ u
t
γ
Q
s ds
]
du
∑4M
i=1 D(t, t + j/4)E
Q
t
[
e−
∫ u
t
λ
Q
s ds
]
EPt
[
e−
∫ u
t
γ
Q
s ds
] . (7)
3Jarrow, Lando and Yu (2005) establish the risk premium framework in the intensity models,
and they clearly distinguish between the distress risk premium, that is, compensation for changes
in the fundamentals, and the default-event premium, or compensation for the changes in the price
of the security in the event of default. Our formulation closely follows the literature on the default
distress risk premium in Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al. (2011) and Zinna (2013),
among others.
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3. Econometric framework and results
3.1. The dataset
Our dataset is composed of bi-weekly sovereign CDS spreads for seven coun-
tries belonging to the G8 group (United States, Japan, Germany, France, United
Kingdom, Italy and Russia). Canada has been excluded because of data avail-
ability. We have at our disposal a full spectrum of maturities ranging from 1 to 10
years. The information about bid-ask spreads across all maturities is also available
to us. The data comprise a maximum (minimum) of 192 (140) observations from
January 2006 to May 2013, with the exception of the US and the UK, whose data
start in January 2008. The contracts are denominated in dollars under the com-
plete restructuring (CR) clause. The dataset has been taken from CMA, a leading
provider of CDS data.
To obtain a general overview of the sovereign market, a summary of the dataset
is reported in Table 1. The US market, with more than $3 billion of net amount
outstanding, is the smallest contract. On the opposite side, the European countries
are the most traded, partly due to the European sovereign debt difficulties during
the last few years. Italy, at the center of the sovereign crisis, is the largest contract
being traded, with $22.5 billion that would be exchanged in the event of default
if no recovery from the defaulted underlying bonds is due. Not surprisingly, the
average CDS spread of Italy is over 100 basis points, as investors are worried
about a likely default event in the near future.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Both Table 1 and Figure 1 highlight the differences in liquidity across ma-
turities. Figure 1 depicts the absolute (upper graph) and relative (lower graph)
cross-sectional average bid-ask spread for 1-, 5- and 10-year maturities involved
in the analysis. Several conclusions arise from an inspection of Figure 1. First,
the 1-year maturity contract exhibits, on average, a higher bid-ask spread in ab-
solute and relative terms. This fact indicates that illiquidity risk may exhibit a
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short-run horizon, suggesting that an idiosyncratic liquidity factor is being priced
into the one-year CDS contracts. A similar pattern is reported by Pan and Sin-
gleton (2008) for emerging economies. In contrast, the 5-year contract displays
the lowest absolute and relative bid-ask spreads. Second, the effects of Lehman
Brothers’ collapse and the European sovereign debt crisis have resulted in sys-
tematic liquidity events. For example, the absolute bid-ask spreads peaked around
those dates close to September 2008 (Lehman Brothers’ default) and March 2012
(Greek sovereign debt restructure). Finally, the relative bid-ask spreads exhibit a
downward trend during the sample period, increasing at the end.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3.2. Model estimation and results
The parameters of the model in Section 2 are estimated by maximum likeli-
hood (ML). Our methodology can be summarized in four steps. First, we assume
that 1- and 5-year CDS spreads are perfectly priced. Additionally, the 5-year con-
tract is assumed to be free of illiquidity frictions, so there is no significant illiquid-
ity discount for this maturity. Then, we implicitly consider that maturities other
than 5 years incorporate an illiquidity risk premium that compensates investors for
trading alternative maturities to the most liquid contract. Second, we conjecture
a time series of the λQ process by inversion of the pricing function of the 5-year
CDS for a given set of parameters by means of a non-linear technique. Condi-
tional on the λQ path, we also obtain a path for γQ by repeating this procedure on
the 1-year contract. Both the λQ and γQ processes are employed subsequently for
pricing the remaining default swaps.
In the step three, differences between the sample and theoretical remaining
CDS contract maturities are priced with normally distributed errors ǫM, with zero
mean and standard deviation σM. We employ the bootstrapped USD Libor-Swap
curve as a risk-free rate to discount future payoffs, as in Berndt et al. (2005).4
4The recent financial crisis raises some concerns about the standard proxies of the risk-free
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Then, we maximize the likelihood function
f P(Θ, λ, γ) = f P(ǫM |Θ, λ
Q, γQ) × f PAR(ln λ
Q|Θ) ×
∣∣∣∂CDS Q(λQ|Θ)/∂λQ∣∣∣−1
× f PAR(ln γ
Q|Θ, λQ) ×
∣∣∣∂CDS Q(γQ|Θ, λQ)/∂γQ∣∣∣−1 , (8)
where Θ is the parameter vector Θ = (κQ
i
, κ
Q
i
θ
Q
i
, σ
Q
i
, κPi , κ
P
i θ
P
i , σM,R
Q), i = 1, 2,
f P(·) is the density function of the Normal distribution, f PAR(·) is the Gaussian den-
sity of an AR(1) process, and ∆t is equal to 1/26. Finally, given that expectations
of the log-OU process in (5) and (7) are not in closed form, they are computed
numerically using the Crank-Nicholson scheme.
Table 2 provides the ML estimates of the two-factor model under study. With
regard to the default process, the mean-reversion rates (κQ
1
) under the Q measure
are systematically lower than their actual counterparts (κP1 ). This result suggests
an explosive behavior of the arrival of default events in the market CDS spreads.
Additionally, the mean-arrival rates of credit events under the risk-neutral measure
are higher than under the actual one (κQ
1
θ
Q
1
> κP1θ
P
1 ), which results in an arrival of
credit events much more intense in the risk-neutral than the actual world. In other
words, the risk-neutral environment worsens over time (the arrival of credit events
increases) with respect to the actual intensity. These results are consistent with
those previously obtained by Pan and Singleton (2008), where a systematic default
risk premium is being priced in the sovereign CDS spreads of three emerging
economies.
rate curve. Lando (2004) and references therein discuss the role of the swap curve, concluding
that this curve is the standard risk-free curve for pricing longer maturities. Longstaff et al. (2011)
demonstrate the robustness of their model estimates to the discounting curve employed. They
argue that moving from the swap curve to the Treasury curve for discounting future clash-flows has
no effect on the price of the default swap because the discounting curve is applied symmetrically
to both sides of the contract. Therefore, the swap curve is considered by the market as riskless
despite its limitations. In any case, the literature does not seem to provide a clear alternative to
our measure. This article employs the 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month USD Libor that is published by the
British Bankers’Association and the 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7- and 10-year USD interest rate swaps from
the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15.
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The point estimates for parameters related to the illiquidity process reveal
some interesting aspects. Table 2 suggests that a positive illiquidity risk premium
is priced in the sovereign CDS market. It is also observed that the mean-reversion
rates are higher under actual than risk-neutral measures (κP2>κ
Q
2
), revealing that
an explosive behavior of the illiquidity discount process is implied in the market
spreads. However, the long-term mean of the process is much more intense in
the risk-neutral than the actual environment (κQ
2
θ
Q
2
> κP2θ
P
2 ). Such a size disparity
in mean-reversion and long-run parameters under both measures indicates that,
although a low discount process of illiquidity is considered in the actual world,
the risk-neutral scenario is significantly stressed. These facts are consistent with a
systematic departure of risk-neutral from real intensities that diverge as time goes
by. This fact is also corroborated by the systematic negative signs of δ02 and δ12.
To put it another way, CDS investors demand a higher risk premium for trading
an illiquid contract with respect to the 5-year benchmark.
Another interesting result in Table 2 concerns the fluctuations of the discount
processes. A comparison of the ML estimates shows that the illiquidity discount
volatility is significantly higher than the default volatility (σQ
2
> σ
Q
1
). This result
is independent of the economy under analysis, and it suggests that liquidity shocks
tend to exhibit a higher uncertainty than the default shocks. These findings seem
to indicate a more strained environment in the illiquidity factor.
The volatility of the mispricing errors (σM) is 15 basis points (bps) on average.
Measurement errors are negligible in terms of the level of CDS spread, suggesting
a good performance of the model. Finally, the point estimates for the implied
risk-neutral recovery rates (RQ) indicate a classification of the economies into
three different groups, according to their degree of creditworthiness implied by
the market: high (Germany and UK); medium (US, Japan, France and Italy); and
low (Russia).
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4. Liquidity patterns in the sovereign CDS market
After quantifying the market compensation to investors for illiquidity and de-
fault risk, this section analyzes their potential sources of variability using financial
and macroeconomic information.
4.1. The discount processes
Figure 2 depicts the time evolution of the risk-neutral default (λQ) and illiq-
uidity (γQ) discount processes. For ease of explanation, this Figure also includes
some relevant economic events during the period under analysis. Some interest-
ing features can be observed in Figure 2. The default intensity is time-varying,
and it spikes on financially distressed moments such as the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. This event led to a worldwide shock in the default level that spread to
the remaining developed economies. The default discount is much more intense
for Russia and Italy, and Japan and the US exhibit the lowest default intensities.
The Figure also shows a rise in the market default probabilities for the European
Monetary Union (EMU) core countries: Germany and France. These countries
show a significant commonality in the default processes, possibly as a reaction to
the Greek crisis that began in March 2010.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In general, illiquidity shocks are linked to a stressed environment. It seems
that illiquidity problems appear when the default conditions erode. Furthermore,
the dynamics of the illiquidity processes are less persistent than those of the de-
fault one. Illiquidity exhibits a stronger mean-reversion pattern than default does,
suggesting that illiquidity crises are short-lived episodes. For example, this pattern
is clearly observable for Japan, the UK and Russia after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and for the EMU countries during the sovereign debt crisis. While the
illiquidity discount is lower than the default discount in general, the illiquidity
discount can dominate the default one during some distressed episodes, as seen
for the US, Japan and France.
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4.2. The compensation for illiquidity
Figure 3 plots the compensation for illiquidity (right axis) and default (left
axis) risks. This Figure solely focuses on the results for the 1-year CDS ma-
turity; recall that the 5-year default swap does not contain a liquidity premium
by assumption. Figure 3 shows that, in addition to a default risk premium, an
illiquidity risk premium is being priced in the sovereign CDS market. This com-
pensation for illiquidity also varies substantially over time and, as expected, it is
significantly affected by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, especially in the case
of Russia. The illiquidity premium tends to be relatively more important than
the default premium under financial distress. This is the case of Japan during the
Lehman Brothers’ default and of the EMU countries – Germany, France and Italy
– during the European sovereign debt crisis.
Illiquidity premia are heterogeneous across countries: the US and the UK
exhibit a significantly lower reward for illiquidity than the other economies. In
accordance with the pattern described for the discount processes, the illiquidity
risk premium exhibits a higher mean reversion pattern than the default premium;
the sovereign CDS market appears to accommodate liquidity shocks in a short
period of time.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
To examine whether illiquidity risk is country-specific or driven by global fac-
tors, we study the principal component structure of the (standardized) illiquidity
and default risk premia time series. Table 3 summarizes this information. The first
principal component (PC) accounts for approximately 37% of the total explained
variance of the illiquidity premia series. Relative to default, the variability ex-
plained is higher and reaches 56% of the default premia. These values reflect the
existence of strong commonalities for either the illiquidity or default risk premia
across countries. With the exception of the US, all the economies have associ-
ated non-negligible loadings for the first principal component of illiquidity. This
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feature suggests that while liquidity stress conditions tend to disseminate in the
Euro-area, Japan and Russia in a similar way, the US economy has a specific
component in the time evolution of illiquidity risk premia.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The second PC also gathers an important portion of the total variance. The to-
tal explained variance increases up to 57% and 85% for the illiquidity and default
processes, respectively. This result indicates that illiquidity exhibits a more id-
iosyncratic nature than default does. As to illiquidity, the loadings corresponding
to the second PCs for the US, Germany, France and Italy are positive, while they
are negative for the rest of the countries in the sample. This second PC could be
interpreted as a spread between countries being affected more intensively by the
financial crisis and the rest of the countries.
4.3. On the relationship between the illiquidity risk and economic variables
Previous results suggest the existence of systematic risks priced in sovereign
CDS contracts. Given the evidence of strong commonality in sovereign risk pre-
mia, the next step is to explore the possible economic factors behind these risks.
To identify these possible sources of risk, we project the illiquidity and default
risk premia onto a set of key financial market variables. In particular, we struc-
ture our analysis according to four major areas: liquidity, stock market, currency
markets, and bond market.5
First, we examine the connection between illiquidity and default risk premia
with traditional measures of illiquidity in the CDS market. In this regard, we
construct the first principal components of the 1-year bid-ask spreads and the net
5Although the list of possible regressor candidates is huge, we mainly employ financial market
variables because they aggregate an important part of the available information in the economy
(Longstaff et al., 2011). Along these lines, we employ the first principal components of the finan-
cial variables because these components gather the major portion of the joint variability.
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outstanding volume of the default swaps to capture the overall illiquidity in the
CDS market. The bid-ask spread represents the spread earned by market makers
acting as intermediaries and holding zero-net positions in the CDS market, see
Bongaerts et al. (2011). The net volume represents the liquidity risk and is defined
as the agreed maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers and net
buyers of protection that would be exchanged after a credit event (Tang and Yan,
2007).
Second, to capture the global state of the economy, we use financial variables
commonly employed in related papers of CDS analysis, such as those of Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) and
Dieckmann and Plank (2012). Given the importance of the equity market, it is
worth studying how this market relates to our measures of illiquidity and default
premia. To reflect the variation in the equity markets we employ the first prin-
cipal component of the different local stock markets (DAX, FTSE 100, NIKKEI
225, RTS, S&P 500, CAC 40, and FTSE MIB). Another important factor in the
stock market is the volatility premium; see Longstaff et al. (2011). Thus, we also
include the volatility premium of the US economy using the difference between
the VIX index – an option-implied volatility index – and the Garman and Klass
(1980) volatility estimator. Third, regarding the currency market, we include the
first principal component of the exchange rates of the US dollar against the cor-
responding national currency (Japanese Yen, Euro, Pound Sterling, and Russian
Ruble). Fourth, to account for the conditions of the corporate bond market, we
include the difference between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
Indexes.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates for the increments in the first principal
components (PC1 and PC2) from the illiquidity and default risk premia against
the increments in our set of financial variables. Focusing on the illiquidity pre-
mia from the countries in our sample, the first component exhibits a positive and
a highly statistically significant beta with the 1-year bid-ask spreads. In other
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words, positive increments in market makers’ earnings are linked to increments of
the illiquidity premium. Interestingly, the behavior of the stock market returns is
negatively correlated with the illiquidity’s first PC, suggesting that negative global
news about dividends and stock returns are also priced in the sovereign CDS mar-
ket via an illiquidity channel. The adjusted-R2 of the regression, with bid-ask and
stock market as the main drivers, reaches 20%.
With regard to the second PC of the illiquidity premia, we find a significant
(and positive) relation with the bid-ask spread and the net notional volume of CDS,
both traditional liquidity measures of the CDS market. Recall that the second PC
of the illiquidity could be interpreted as a spread between countries being affected
more intensively by the financial crisis (France, Germany, Italy and US) and the
rest. Interestingly, the countries most affected by the crisis are the most traded, and
together they represent 74% of the total net outstanding CDS volume. Therefore,
this second component seems be exclusively related to market-wide liquidity risk
in countries affected by the financial crisis.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Concerning the default risk, Table 4 shows that the default premium betas of
first PC are statistically significant for bid-ask spreads, stock market, volatility
premium and currency markets. The aggregate bid-ask spread covariates posi-
tively with the first component of default risk, reflecting that increments of aggre-
gate default risk are linked to increments of the market illiquidity measured by
bid-ask spreads. In contrast, the associated betas for stock, volatility and currency
variables are negative and significant at the 1% confidence level. The economic
interpretation is that a decline in the aggregate stock market, volatility premium
or exchange rate results in increments of the aggregate default risk compensation.
These results are broadly consistent with previous findings in the related litera-
ture. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Ericsson et al. (2009), Longstaff et al. (2011)
and Dieckmann and Plank (2012) show that the stock index has a negative impact
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on corporate and sovereign credit spreads. Longstaff et al. (2011) find a negative
relation between the volatility premium and the default risk premium. Longstaff
et al. (2011) and Dieckmann and Plank (2012) find that a depreciation of the cur-
rencies against the dollar increases the sovereign default swap spreads. Hilscher
and Nosbusch (2010) and Dieckmann and Plank (2012) do not find strong evi-
dence that the default yield spread between Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate debt
affects sovereign credit spreads.
The explanatory power of the model is also remarkable, as reflected by an
adjusted-R2 that exceeds 45%. Surprisingly, bid-ask spreads is the only significant
variable in explaining the second PC of default premia. The loadings in the second
component of default premia distinguish between the group composed of the US,
the UK and Russia and the group containing the rest. The strong relation between
bid-ask spreads and the default premia is in line with the findings of Bongaerts
et al. (2011), where these authors show that bid-ask spreads and CDS spreads
are positively related. Consistent with an increasing globalization of the world’s
economies in recent years, these results suggest that overall illiquidity and default
market conditions are closely related across countries.
In sum, our results show that the illiquidity discount processes exhibit a strong
mean-reversion pattern. Illiquidity crises are linked to stressed periods, and a posi-
tive illiquidity risk premium seems to be priced in the sovereign CDSmarket. This
illiquidity premium exhibits a notable degree of commonality, and two principal
components capture approximately 57% of the total variance. These components
covariate positively with aggregate illiquidity variables such as the bid-ask spread
and net outstanding CDS volumes. Moreover, the aggregate stock market risk
seems to be relevant for explaining the variability of the illiquidity risk premium.
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5. The relationship between aggregate illiquidity and aggregate default risk
premia
Previous empirical findings place us in a privileged position to analyze the
joint dynamics of illiquidity and default risk in the credit derivatives market. This
section delves into the link between illiquidity and default risk compensation. To
this end, we consider the information embedded in the first principal components
of illiquidity (ILLIQ) and default (DEF) risk premia computed in Section 3. The
use of these principal components in our analysis provides interesting advantages.
For instance, the loading coefficients of the first principal components are nearly
equal. Moreover, the ILLIQ and DEF variables account for an important fraction
of the joint variability of the sample, making these variables into potential proxies
of aggregate illiquidity and aggregate default risk premia.
To explore the joint dynamics of ILLIQ and DEF, we use a vector autore-
gressive (VAR) model. As a first step in our analysis, we run a bivariate VAR,
a parsimonious representation of the methodology. Table 5 reports the Granger
causality tests.6 Panel A shows the chi-square statistics for the first model. The
tests show that the illiquidity premium does not precede the default compensa-
tion. In contrast, this default compensation seems to bring information into the
illiquidity premium.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
As a second step, we enlarge the model specification by including additional
information from financial variables such as the stock market (S TOCK) and the
bid-ask spread (BIDAS K). These variables were previously identified as poten-
tial variables of interest in the analysis in Table 4. Then, we run a four-variable
VAR that comprises illiquidity (ILLIQ), default (DEF), stock market and bid-ask
6For the sake of exposition, the model coefficient estimates and their significance are not dis-
played but are available upon request.
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spread. Panel B of Table 5 reports the causality tests for these four variables. The
presence of the stock market and the bid-ask spreads significantly reduces the di-
rect effect of the default premium on the illiquidity premium. The variable ILLIQ
does not precede DEF.
These previous results seem to be consistent with the idea that default is a
driver of illiquidity in the CDS market. To further examine this idea, Figure 4 de-
picts the impulse-response figures for the bivariate (Panel A) and the four variable
(Panel B) models. On the one hand, Panel A reveals a strong positive increase in
the illiquidity compensation as a response to a shock in the default risk compen-
sation (left graph). This shock lasts at least 10 weeks. In contrast, the response in
default to a shock in illiquidity is not statistically significant (right graph). On the
other hand, Panel B shows an insignificant response in the illiquidity compensa-
tion after a shock in the default compensation when we include the stock market
and the bid-ask spreads in the VAR model. More interestingly, we find that the
largest response in the illiquidity compensation comes after a shock in the stock
market.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
A closer look at the importance of the stock and bid-ask spread variables in
the illiquidity risk premium is provided in Table 6, which presents the variance
decomposition of the illiquidity premium variable. This table reports the percent-
age of variation in ILLIQ as a result of a shock in S TOCK, DEF, BIDAS K, and
ILLIQ. Each row must sum to one because the sum represents the total variation
in ILLIQ. The largest response of ILLIQ in the first two weeks (78.91%) follow-
ing the shocks is due to its own shock. However, the effect of this shock declines
smoothly. The decomposition reveals that most of the variability in the illiquidity
comes from new information arriving for the stock market and the bid-ask spread.
For example, the percentage of variation of the illiquidity due to changes in the
bid-ask spread is 12.80% after eight weeks. A shock to the stock market initially
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has a small impact, but after the first few weeks, the importance of the variable
increases, accounting for 21.20% of the variability in the long-run. Therefore,
only the bid-ask spread and the stock market seem to be important in explaining
illiquidity prices. The default premium does not represent an important fraction
of the total variability. Again, this result suggests that the relationship obtained
in the bivariate VAR model is due to other sources of information affecting the
CDS market and not to a direct effect of the default premium on the illiquidity
premium.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
This relation between our aggregate illiquidity premium and the other mar-
ket prices is instructive, as it highlights the important fact that illiquidity prices
in the credit market are a result of unexpected events affecting the financial mar-
kets overall. Illiquidity compensation is not just a result of events affecting only
sovereign credit market participants. In particular, our results show that the stock
market is rather informative about the liquidity prices in the CDS market. We find
that the stock market reversals seem to convey information into illiquidity prices
that may last up to half a year.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies the existence of a compensation for illiquidity in sovereign
credit markets. Using the information content in the term structure of the credit
default swap spreads, we estimate a continuous time two-factor model that uncov-
ers the risk-neutral illiquidity (γQ) and default (λQ) discount processes from CDS
prices. The maximum likelihood estimates of the model show that the discount
illiquidity process presents a stronger mean-reversion pattern than the default dis-
count. Moreover, illiquidity-distressed episodes are short-lasting.
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Our results also suggest that a positive illiquidity risk premium is being priced
in the sovereign CDS market. This illiquidity premium is related to the risk of
unwinding the positions in short-term contracts, and it can exceed the default
compensation during the stressed periods. The illiquidity premia also exhibit a
notable degree of commonality: two principal components capture approximately
57% of the total variance. These principal components covariate with aggregate
illiquidity variables such as the bid-ask spread and net volumes, and the estimated
correlations are positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that
a relevant portion of information about the aggregate illiquidity risk in the CDS
market could be priced in the default swap curve and, indeed, can be captured
by our illiquidity premium. In addition, the stock market is also significant in
explaining the variability of the illiquidity risk premium.
We also develop a vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis on the illiquidity and
default first components to inspect their dynamics. The Granger causality tests
show that shocks in the aggregate default compensation have a positive impact on
the aggregate liquidity premium. However, the causality in the opposite direction
is rejected at conventional significant levels. Therefore, changes in the illiquidity
compensation could appear as a result of a shock affecting default. This pat-
tern of causality disappears after controlling for bid-ask spreads and stock market
changes, suggesting that there is no direct effect of default premium on the illiq-
uidity premium.
Our empirical findings could contribute to the current debate on the role of
liquidity in credit derivative markets. The systematic nature of illiquidity shocks
enhances the advantages of a coordinated trading system to improve pricing ef-
ficiency, to favor credit risk hedging during distressed market conditions, and to
make CDS trading less vulnerable to liquidity droughts.
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Table 1: Average market size and price by country
Net volume CDS1y CDS5y Bid-Ask1y Bid-Ask5y
(billion USD) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps)
France 15.1 27.68 60.37 3.53 3.06
Germany 15.1 13.45 33.55 2.71 2.64
Italy 22.5 107.65 156.22 10.88 4.75
Japan 6.49 18.64 52.86 3.85 3.82
Russia 4.81 125.82 180.93 14.04 4.57
UK 8.54 29.06 62.54 4.79 4.19
US 3.28 23.87 38.46 6.97 5.10
The CDS prices and Bid-Ask spreads are obtained from CMA through Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream. The Net Volume Outstanding is obtained from The Depository Trust & Clearing Corpo-
ration (DTCC). The sample period covers January 2006 to May 2013, and the data frequency is
bi-weekly.
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood model parameters
Countries
Parameters US Japan Germany France UK Italy Russia
κ
Q
1
0.4275 0.2088 -0.7022 0.3913 -1.9265 0.0286 0.2603
(0.0865) (0.0342) (0.1489) (0.1517) (0.2295) (0.0360) (0.0228)
κ
Q
1
θ
Q
1
-2.8246 -1.1918 3.2654 -2.2515 12.9776 -0.2119 -1.1763
(0.6241) (0.2837) (0.6577) (1.1100) (1.1017) (0.2370) (0.0803)
σ
Q
1
1.8865 1.8833 0.7870 2.3753 2.6297 1.0052 0.9995
(0.1550) (0.1700) (0.1075) (0.1907) (0.2511) (0.0660) (0.1364)
κP1 2.2354 2.3093 0.5399 0.8503 1.8554 0.2193 0.8024
(1.3713) (1.2724) (0.6261) (1.6694) (1.4915) (0.2928) (0.2371)
κP1θ
P
1 -15.2733 -17.4990 -2.6678 -6.5940 -11.7592 -1.0977 -4.2585
(9.2364) (9.1227) (2.8634) (11.2957) (8.0996) (1.3298) (1.2282)
κ
Q
2
2.5157 1.0000 -0.8336 1.0000 -1.7852 -0.1563 0.6562
(0.2141) (0.0893) (0.2374) (0.1249) (0.2985) (0.0800) (0.0687)
κ
Q
2
θ
Q
2
-30.0000 -26.0000 -1.5765 -26.0000 2.4209 -29.9531 -29.0000
(3.5732) (1.6493) (1.0868) (6.1683) (0.6246) (30.0538) (12.9901)
σ
Q
2
5.9688 7.7471 6.0444 7.7920 8.2834 13.0352 10.4736
(0.5745) (0.4570) (0.2287) (0.9832) (0.6674) (5.6994) (2.4431)
κP2 10.2813 10.0342 5.6355 10.4991 13.2951 30.0000 25.2783
(2.6862) (3.1077) (1.8521) (4.1381) (3.5110) (14.4270) (7.2493)
κP2θ
P
2 -70.2813 -84.0000 -47.2718 -82.0000 -128.3527 -281.6250 -248.0000
(23.5931) (29.8984) (18.0753) (35.3029) (35.4439) (140.6748) (69.4638)
σM 0.0008 0.0011 0.0011 0.0014 0.0017 0.0018 0.0026
(0.0002) (0.0126) (0.0540) (0.0712) (0.0287) (0.1139) (0.1298)
RQ 0.4943 0.5721 0.9411 0.5675 0.9472 0.5957 0.1696
(0.0444) (0.0696) (0.0114) (0.1080) (0.0004) (0.0364) (0.0737)
LogLk 8278.48 10463.40 10715.38 9931.51 7056.57 9384.24 8627.24
N 140 192 192 192 140 192 192
This table provides the maximum likelihood estimates for the model of Arakelyan et al. (2013).
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Parameters κQ
i
, κQ
i
θ
Q
i
and σQ
i
, with i = 1, 2, denote the mean
reversion, long-run mean and instantaneous volatility of default intensity (λQ) and illiquidity (γQ)
processes under the Q probability measure. Analogously, κP
i
, κP
i
θP
i
and σP
i
are the mean-reversion
rate and long-run mean under the objective measure P. σM is the standard deviation of the residu-
als. The sample period covers January 2006 to May 2013, and the data frequency is weekly.
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Table 3: Principal components for illiquidity and default risk premia
Illiquidity Default
Country PC1 PC2 PC3 PC1 PC2 PC3
United States -0.04 0.32 0.75 0.30 0.48 -0.37
Japan 0.44 -0.34 0.32 0.44 -0.17 -0.43
Germany 0.56 0.24 0.10 0.48 -0.09 0.03
France 0.40 0.52 -0.06 0.45 -0.28 0.21
United Kingdom 0.31 -0.46 -0.22 0.32 0.47 -0.21
Italy 0.28 0.35 -0.50 0.41 -0.30 0.40
Russia 0.39 -0.34 0.16 0.13 0.58 0.66
Explained variance (%) 36.57 20.02 15.47 56.22 28.81 6.68
This table provides the loading coefficients and explained variance for the illiquidity and default
risk premia of the sovereign CDS under study. The sample period covers January 2006 to May
2013, and the data frequency is bi-weekly.
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Table 4: Regressions for the illiquidity and default premia
Illiquidity premium Default premium
∆PC1 ∆PC2 ∆PC1 ∆PC2
∆PC1 BidAsk1y .2361*** .3219*** .1517** .2056***
∆PC1 NetVol .3005 .6045* .0783 -.1647
∆PC1 Mkt local -.2601** .207 -.7372*** .0067
∆Vol Premium -.0113 -.0095 -.0281*** .0031
∆PC1 Forex -.0322 -.2181 -.7965*** -.3685
∆Corporate BAA-AAA 1.02 -.962 -.7215 -.617
Cons. .0169 -.0419 .0172 -.0181
Obs. 117 117 117 117
R2-Adj 0.1991 0.0736 0.4554 0.1409
The significance of the variables is tested using White (1980) t-statistics. * for
p<.10, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
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Table 5: Granger causality tests
Equation Excluded χ2 df Prob > χ2
Panel A.- Default and illiquidity
ILLIQ DEF 34.362 2 0.000
DEF ILLIQ 1.5121 2 0.470
Panel B.- Default, illiquidity, bid-ask, and stock market
DEF ILLIQ 2.6551 1 0.103
DEF BIDASK .75207 1 0.386
DEF STOCK .98236 1 0.322
ILLIQ DEF 7.9e-05 1 0.993
ILLIQ BIDASK 11.783 1 0.001
ILLIQ STOCK 10.224 1 0.001
BIDASK DEF .38337 1 0.536
BIDASK ILLIQ 3.087 1 0.079
BIDASK STOCK 4.3337 1 0.037
STOCK DEF .86633 1 0.352
STOCK ILLIQ .93343 1 0.334
STOCK BIDASK 1.9924 1 0.158
Granger causality tests for the bivariate VAR2 model with illiquidity and default risk
premia, and for the multivariate VAR4 model with the illiquidity premium, the default
premium, the bid-ask spread, and the stock market. The variables DEF, ILLIQ, BIDASK,
and STOCK are the first principal components of the default risk premium, the illiquidity
risk premium, the 1-year Bid-Ask spread, and the stock market, respectively. The lag
of VAR2 and VAR4 models is selected according to the Schwarz Bayesian Information
criterion.
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Table 6: Variance decomposition of the four-variable VAR model
Step STOCK DEF BIDASK ILLIQ
1 8.33 2.58 10.18 78.91
2 10.77 1.94 11.36 75.93
4 14.81 1.22 12.80 71.17
10 21.20 0.63 13.33 64.84
15 23.09 0.53 12.62 63.76
25 24.10 0.60 11.57 63.73
50 24.26 1.11 10.95 63.68
Error variance decomposition for the model VAR4. Each column displays the
proportion of the variance of the error from forecasting k steps ahead the re-
sponse variable, due to the impulse in the variable indicated in the column
heading. The results depend on the ordering of the variables. The order em-
ployed is STOCK, DEF, BIDASK, and ILLIQ. The sample period covers from
January 2006 to May 2013, and the data frequency is bi-weekly.
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Figure 1: Bid-ask spreads
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Absolute (upper) and relative (lower) cross-sectional average bid-ask
spreads of sovereign CDS spreads. Maturities are 1-, 5- and 10-year. The
data frequency is weekly and covers January 2006 to May 2013.
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Figure 2: Default and (relative) illiquidity discount processes
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Risk-neutral default (λQ) and (relative) illiquidity (γQ) discount processes of
sovereign CDS spreads. The data frequency is bi-weekly and covers January
2006 to May 2013.
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Figure 3: Default and (relative) illiquidity risk premium
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Default and (relative) illiquidity risk premia of sovereign CDS spreads. The
data frequency is bi-weekly and covers January 2006 to May 2013.
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Figure 4: Impulse-response analysis
Panel A: VAR2 model
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Impulse-response figures for the aggregate illiquidity and default risk premia.
Upper (lower) graphs correspond to the VAR2 model (VAR4 model). The shaded
area represents the 95% confidence interval. The data frequency is bi-weekly and
covers January 2006 to May 2013.
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